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Introduction	  
In	  2012,	  about	  $3.74	  trillion	  out	  of	  $33.3	  trillion	   in	  total	  assets	  under	  professional	  management	   in	  the	  
United	  States	  was	  invested	  in	  socially	  responsible	  investment	  (SRI)	  strategies	  (Forum	  for	  Sustainable	  and	  
Responsible	   Investment,	   2012).	   This	   indicates	   a	   486	   percent	   increase	   from	   $639	   million	   invested	   in	  
1995.	  In	  comparison,	  the	  broader	  universe	  of	  assets	  under	  professional	  management	  has	  grown	  just	  376	  
percent	   in	   that	   same	  period	   (Forum	  for	  Sustainable	  and	  Responsible	   Investment,	  2012).	  SRI	   strategies	  
include	   Environmental,	   Social,	   and	   Governance	   (ESG)	   incorporation,	   Shareholder	   Advocacy,	   and	  
Community	  Investing.	  With	  regard	  to	  shareholder	  advocacy,	  from	  2010	  to	  2012	  about	  176	  institutional	  
investors	  with	  $1.28	  trillion	  in	  assets	  filed	  or	  co-­‐filed	  proposals	  (Forum	  for	  Sustainable	  and	  Responsible	  
Investment,	   2012).	   These	   institutional	   investors	   include	   public	   funds,	   religious	   investors,	   labor	   funds,	  
foundations	  and	  endowments.	  	  
	  
The	  involvement	  of	  religious	  investors	  in	  SRI	  should	  come	  as	  no	  surprise	  as	  the	  roots	  of	  social	  investing	  
can	   be	   traced	   back	   to	   the	  Quakers	   and	  Mennonites	   and	  perhaps	   to	   John	  Wesley,	   the	   founder	   of	   the	  
Methodists,	  who	  advocated	  the	  proper	  use	  of	  money	  (Callahan,	  2002;	  Schueth,	  2003).	  In	  the	  latter	  half	  
of	   the	   twentieth	  century,	   the	   involvement	  of	   religious	   institutional	   investors	   in	  SRI	  was	  spurred	  on	  by	  
the	  founding	  of	  the	  Interfaith	  Center	  on	  Corporate	  Responsibility	  (ICCR)	   in	  1971	  (Smith	  &	  Wolf,	  2002).	  
The	  center	  was	  founded	  largely	  in	  response	  to	  the	  growing	  concern	  over	  American	  involvement	  during	  
the	  Vietnam	  War	  and	  the	  issue	  of	  apartheid	  in	  South	  Africa.	  	  
	  
The	   center’s	   first	   social	   policy	   resolution	   was	   filed	   in	   1971	   with	   General	   Motors	   calling	   for	   GM	   to	  
withdraw	   from	  South	  Africa	   (Smith	  &	  Wolf,	  2002).	  By	  1975,	   ICCR	  had	  about	   twelve	  Protestant	   church	  
agencies	  and	  twenty-­‐eight	  Roman	  Catholic	  organizations	  in	  their	  membership.	  In	  2002	  the	  membership	  
had	  grown	  to	  275	  Protestant,	  Catholic	  and	  Jewish	  institutional	  investors	  (Smith	  &	  Wolf,	  2002).	  Included	  
in	   the	   Roman	   Catholic	   membership	   from	   the	   early	   years	   of	   ICCR	   was	   the	   U.S.	   Jesuit	   Conference	  
representing	  a	  religious	  order	  of	  men	  known	  as	   the	  Society	  of	   Jesus	  or	  more	  commonly	  as	   the	  Jesuits	  
(Callahan,	  2002).	  	  
	  
A	  major	   reason	   for	   the	   involvement	  of	   religious	   institutional	   investors	   in	   SRI	   is	   that	  of	   "bringing	   forth	  
God’s	  reign	  of	  justice	  on	  earth"	  (Smith	  &	  Wolf,	  2002	  p.	  ).	  These	  investors	  see	  SRI	  as	  a	  work	  of	  structural	  
justice	  (Jesuit	  Conference,	  2013).	  A	  central	  question	  of	  this	  volume	  is	  whether	  SRI	  strategies	  make	  any	  
difference	   to	   society.	   The	   growing	   number	   of	   religious	   institutional	   investors	   that	   are	   engaged	   in	  
shareholder	   advocacy	   is	   itself	   a	   testimony	   to	   the	   value	   that	   these	   investors	   perceive	   in	   engaging	  
corporations	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  issues	  that	  affect	  the	  economy,	  community	  and	  environment.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  
this	  group	  of	  investors	  might	  persist	  with	  their	  SRI	  investments	  in	  anticipation	  of	  future	  impact,	  even	  if	  
current	   evidence	   is	   either	   lacking	   or	   not	   sufficiently	   convincing.	   As	   is	   pointed	   out	   in	   ICCR’s	   Social	  
Sustainability	   Resource	   Guide,	   religious	   institutional	   investors	   play	   a	   dual	   role	   as	   “investors	   and	   as	  
community	   participants”	   and	   are	   placed	   “in	   a	   unique	   position	   to	   address	   the	   relationship	   between	  
Chapter	  3	  Santos	  et	  al.	  
2	  	  
corporate	   operations	   and	   their	   social	   impacts	   on	   communities”	   (Interfaith	   Center	   for	   Corporate	  
Responsibility,	   2011,	  p.	   7).	   In	   this	   chapter	  we	   focus	  on	  one	   such	   shareholder	  advocacy	  effort,	   namely	  
that	  of	  the	  Jesuits	  with	  Chevron	  Corporation,	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  human	  rights.	  
	  
This	   chapter	   is	   laid	  out	   in	   the	   following	  manner.	  We	  begin	  with	  a	  brief	  background	  of	   the	   Jesuits	  and	  
their	  involvement	  with	  Socially	  Responsible	  Investing	  (SRI)	   in	  the	  United	  States.	  This	  effort,	  particularly	  
over	   the	   last	   decade,	   has	   involved	   dialogue	  with	   a	   number	   of	   large	   corporations	   such	   as	   Chevron	   on	  
specific	  issues.	  Mobilizing	  shareholders	  and	  engaging	  a	  company	  as	  large	  as	  Chevron	  are	  not	  easy	  tasks	  
and	  are	  detailed	   in	  the	  next	  section	  of	  the	  chapter.	  Further,	  much	  of	  the	  dialogue	  took	  place	   in	  North	  
America,	  where	  the	  company	  is	  headquartered	  while	  many	  of	  the	  human	  rights	  issues	  being	  discussed	  
were	  occurring	  in	  the	  developing	  world	  in	  regions	  such	  as	  the	  Niger	  Delta.	  The	  section	  on	  “Engagement	  
of	  the	  local	  community”	  shares	  the	  collaboration	  with	  the	  Center	  for	  Social	  and	  Corporate	  Responsibility	  
(CSCR)	  and	  then	  later	  with	  the	  Africa	  Center	  for	  Corporate	  Responsibility	  (ACCR)	  that	  helped	  in	  bringing	  
awareness	  of	  on-­‐the-­‐ground	  realities	  in	  the	  Niger	  Delta.	  We	  then	  analyze	  the	  case	  from	  the	  perspective	  
of	  stakeholder	  salience	  (Allen,	  Letourneau,	  &	  Hebb,	  2012;	  Gifford,	  2010;	  Mitchell,	  Agle,	  &	  Wood,	  1997).	  
Finally,	  we	  highlight	  some	  of	  the	  key	  lessons	  learned	  and	  suggest	  areas	  for	  further	  research.	  	  
	  
The	  Jesuits	  and	  Socially	  Responsible	  Investing	  	  
The	  Society	  of	   Jesus	   (Jesuits)	   is	  an	   international	  Roman	  Catholic	  Religious	  order	   founded	   in	  1540.	  The	  
Jesuits	  are	  organized	  into	  geographic	  areas	  called	  provinces	  that	  are	  governed	  by	  a	  provincial	  superior	  
who	  is	  appointed	  by	  and	  reports	  directly	  to	  the	  superior	  general	  who	  resides	  in	  Rome.	  The	  provinces	  are	  
grouped	  into	  nine	  regional	  assistancies.	  These	  are:	  Africa,	  Asia	  Pacific,	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe,	  North	  
Latin	   America,	   South	   Asia,	   South	   Europe,	   South	   Latin	   America,	   USA,	   West	   Europe	   (Society	   of	   Jesus,	  
2012b).	   The	   Wisconsin	   Province	   is	   one	   of	   the	   provinces	   of	   the	   USA	   Assistancy	   (Jesuit	   Conference,	  
2012a).	  	  	  
	  
The	  Jesuits	  are	  best	  known	  for	  their	  work	  in	  education.	  Worldwide	  the	  Jesuits	  are	  engaged	  in	  over	  3,700	  
educational	   institutions	   educating	   over	   2.5	  million	   students	   (Jesuit	   Conference,	   2012b).	   In	   the	  United	  
States	  there	  are	  28	  Jesuit	  Universities	  in	  19	  states	  (Association	  of	  Jesuit	  Colleges	  and	  Universities,	  2012).	  
In	   addition	   to	   education	   the	   Jesuits	   are	   also	   known	   for	   their	   spiritual	   and	   pastoral	   work.	   However,	  
education,	  spiritual	  and	  pastoral	  ministries	  are	  not	  the	  only	  works	  that	  the	  Jesuits	  engage	  in.	  Jesuits	  and	  
their	  collaborators	  worldwide	  are	  also	  actively	  engaged	  in	  the	  area	  of	  social	  and	  environmental	   justice	  
(Society	  of	  Jesus,	  2012c).	  	  	  	  
	  
The	  Jesuit	  involvement	  in	  socially	  responsible	  investing	  in	  the	  U.S.	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  formation	  
of	  the	  Jesuit	  Advisory	  Committee	  on	  Investment	  Responsibility	  (JACIR)	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Jesuit	  Conference	  in	  
1974	  (Dister,	  2002).	   	  A	  few	  years	  prior	  to	  this,	   in	  1971,	  the	  Episcopal	  Church	  and	  some	  other	  Christian	  
denomination	   groups	   had	   started	   the	   Interfaith	   Center	   on	   Corporate	   Responsibility	   (ICCR)	   (Callahan,	  
2002).	  JACIR	  and	  ICCR	  began	  largely	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  civil	  uneasiness	  with	  the	  Vietnam	  war	  and	  the	  
system	  of	  apartheid	  in	  South	  Africa	  (Smith	  &	  Wolf,	  2002).	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  formation	  of	  JACIR,	  another	  
Jesuit	  Conference	  group	  called	   the	  National	  Office	  of	   Jesuit	   Social	  Ministries	  was	  already	   in	  operation	  
(Dister,	   2002).	   This	   group	   attended	   shareholders’	   meetings	   and	   proposed	   resolutions	   often	   taking	   a	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more	  activist	  approach	  towards	  corporate	  change.	  Such	  an	  approach	  resulted	  in	  some	  tension	  between	  
this	   group	   and	   JACIR	  which	   tended	   to	   vote	   proxies	   with	   company	  management	   (Dister,	   2002).	  What	  
transpired	   eventually	   was	   that	   JACIR	  was	   dissolved	   in	   1984	   paving	   the	  way	   for	   the	   formation	   of	   the	  
National	  Jesuit	  Committee	  on	  Investment	  Responsibility	  (NJCIR)	  (Dister,	  2002).	  	  
	  
Each	  U.S.	  Jesuit	  province	  now	  has	  a	  provincial	  representative	  and	  sometimes	  a	  committee	  for	   investor	  
responsibility.	   The	  motivation	   for	   the	   Jesuit	   provinces	   to	   get	   involved	   in	   SRI	   ensued	   from	   a	   growing	  
awareness	   of	   the	   potential	   of	   SRI	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	   common	   good.	   Representatives	   from	   each	  
province	   form	   NJCIR.	   The	   mission	   of	   NJCIR	   is	   to	   advocate	   for	   “corporate	   behavior	   consistent	   with	  
Catholic	  Social	  teaching	  through	  dialogues	  with	  corporations,	  shareholder	  resolutions,	  and	  proxy	  voting”	  
(Jesuit	   Conference,	   2012c).	   NJCIR	   identifies	   social	   and	   economic	   justice	   priorities	   in	   light	   of	   Jesuit	  
apostolic	  preferences	  and	  collaborates	  with	  other	  religious	  institutional	  investors	  to	  influence	  corporate	  
policy	   decisions	   in	   these	   areas.	   NJCIR	   has	   also	   encouraged	   and	   consulted	   with	   a	   number	   of	   Jesuit	  
institutions	   (particularly	   higher	   education	   and	   secondary	   education)	   to	   participate	   in	   province-­‐led	  
shareholder	   filings	   and	   engagement.	   As	   of	   2012,	   the	   two	   shareholder	   advocacy	   priorities	  were	  water	  
sustainability	  and	  promoting	  human	  rights	  (Society	  of	  Jesus,	  2012a).	  	  
	  
Over	   the	   last	   decade,	   NJCIR	   has	   successfully	   engaged	   a	   number	   of	   large	   corporations	   in	   the	   areas	   of	  
water	  sustainability	  and	  human	  rights	   (National	  Jesuit	  Committee	  on	  Investment	  Responsibility,	  2011).	  
One	  successful	  engagement	  in	  the	  area	  of	  human	  rights	  was	  with	  Occidental	  Petroleum	  (Oxy)	  and	  was	  
led	  by	  the	  California	  Province	  of	  the	  NJCIR.	   In	  2003,	  NJCIR	  had	  contacted	  Oxy	  to	  convey	  concerns	  that	  
the	   Jesuits	   in	   Columbia	   had	   about	   human	   rights	   abuses	   in	   the	   Arauca	   region	   of	   Columbia	  where	   the	  
company	  had	  oil	  pipeline	  operations.	  Working	  closely	  with	  NJCIR,	  Oxy	  formally	  adopted	  a	  Human	  Rights	  
Policy	   in	   December	   2004	   (GlobeNewswire,	   2004).	   NJCIR	   continued	   to	   be	   engaged	  with	   the	   company	  
through	  2010.	  Dialogue	  topics	  for	  this	  engagement	  “included	  human	  rights	  training,	  impact	  assessments	  
to	   determine	   human	   rights	   risk,	   integrating	   the	   policy	   throughout	   Company	   operations,	   protocols	   for	  
use	  of	  armed	  security,	   social	  and	  economic	  aspects	  of	  community	  engagement,	  and	  transparency	  and	  
reporting	   of	   human	   rights	   performance,	   including	   the	   need	   for	   independent	   verification	   of	   results”	  
(National	   Jesuit	   Committee	   on	   Investment	   Responsibility,	   2011,	   p.	   9).	   NJCIR’s	   engagement	   with	   Oxy	  
achieved	  not	   just	  social	  goals	  but	  also	  a	  significant	  return	  on	   investment.	  From	  September	  2003	  when	  
the	   NJCIR	   first	   contacted	   Oxy	   to	   September	   2010,	   investments	   increased	   by	   496%	   not	   calculating	  
reinvested	  dividends	  (National	  Jesuit	  Committee	  on	  Investment	  Responsibility,	  2011,	  p.	  10).	  	  
	  	  
	  The	   engagement	   with	   Oxy	   is	   only	   one	   of	   NJCIR’s	   engagements.	   Since	   October	   2007,	   NJCIR	   has	   also	  
engaged	  the	  OM	  Group,	  a	  metal-­‐based	  specialty	  chemical	  company,	  to	  develop	  indicators	  for	  a	  human	  
rights	  policy.	  This	  issue	  arose	  out	  of	  safety	  concerns	  of	  small-­‐scale	  miners,	  including	  children	  around	  the	  
company’s	  cobalt	  smelter	  in	  Lubumbashi	  in	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  the	  Congo	  (DRC)	  (National	  Jesuit	  
Committee	  on	  Investment	  Responsibility,	  2009,	  p.	  7).	  At	  the	  OM	  Group	  annual	  meeting	  in	  May	  2011,	  the	  
Jesuit-­‐led	   stockholder	   proposal	   received	   28.47	   percent	   of	   the	   votes	   as	   well	   as	   the	   support	   of	   proxy	  
advisory	   service,	   Institutional	   Shareholder	   Services,	   who	   endorsed	   the	   resolution	   from	   a	   cost/benefit	  
business	  perspective.	  The	  strong	  vote	  led	  to	  the	  development	  of	  an	  OM	  Group	  human	  rights	  policy	  the	  
following	  year	  (OM	  Group,	  2012).	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NJCIR	  has	  also	  worked	  with	  the	  Monsanto	  Company	  to	   implement	  and	  monitor	  a	  human	  rights	  policy.	  
For	   six	   years	   NJCIR	   worked	   with	   Monsanto	   “to	   embed	   human	   rights	   due	   diligence	   into	   its	   global	  
operations	   by	   training	   employees,	   using	   human	   rights	   impact	   assessments,	   monitoring	   and	   auditing	  
results”	   (National	   Jesuit	  Committee	  on	   Investment	  Responsibility,	  2011,	  p.	  6).	   The	  company	  had	  been	  
very	  responsive	  to	  eradicating	  child	  labor	  among	  its	  contract	  growers	  and	  had	  also	  agreed	  to	  expand	  the	  
dialogue	   and	   engagement	   with	   NJCIR	   to	   include	   the	   right	   to	   food,	   especially	   seed	   saving	   rights	   for	  
farmers	  and	  the	  right	  to	  water.	  	  
	  
In	   line	   with	   one	   of	   NJCIR’s	   advocacy	   priorities	   on	   water	   sustainability,	   it	   has	   been	   engaging	   some	  
companies	  around	  this	   issue.	  One	  company	  that	  NJCIR	  has	  engaged	   is	  Bunge	  Limited.	  Bunge	   is	  one	  of	  
the	  world’s	  larger	  agribusiness	  companies.	  The	  Jesuit-­‐led	  investor	  coalition	  has	  encouraged	  Bunge	  to	  be	  
more	  proactive	  in	  its	  reporting	  of	  water	  use	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  water	  risks	  on	  not	  just	  its	  supply	  chain	  but	  
also	   on	   the	   local	   communities	   (National	   Jesuit	   Committee	   on	   Investment	   Responsibility,	   2011,	   p.	   4).	  
Another	   company	   that	  NJCIR	   has	   decided	   to	   engage	  with	   on	   the	   issue	   of	  water	   sustainability	   is	   Corn	  
Products	   International	   (renamed	  “Ingredion”	   in	  2012).	  NJCIR	  voted	   for	   this	  engagement	   in	  September	  
2010	  as	  Corn	  Products	  was	  one	  of	  the	  world’s	  largest	  corn	  refiners	  with	  water	  being	  an	  intrinsic	  resource	  
in	  its	  operations	  in	  about	  20	  countries	  (National	  Jesuit	  Committee	  on	  Investment	  Responsibility,	  2011,	  p.	  
5).	   Through	   this	   engagement	   NJCIR	   hoped	   to	   push	   Corn	   Products	   towards	   more	   meaningful	   data	  
reporting	  on	  water	  consumption	  and	   liquid	  and	  solid	  waste	  as	  well	  as	   to	  have	  explicit	  goals	   to	  reduce	  
resource	  consumption	  (National	  Jesuit	  Committee	  on	  Investment	  Responsibility,	  2011,	  p.	  5).	  	  
	  
According	   to	   the	   NJCIR,	   faith-­‐informed	   socially	   responsible	   investment	   is	   a	   work	   of	   structural	   justice	  
(Jesuit	   Conference,	   2012c).	   In	   the	  U.S.	   this	   effort	   involved	  using	   the	   investment	  portfolios	   of	   the	  U.S.	  
Jesuit	  provinces	  to	  influence	  corporate	  policy	  decisions.	  As	  the	  preceding	  paragraphs	  demonstrate	  such	  
an	  effort	  has	  borne	  tremendous	  fruit.	  Besides	  NJCIR,	  other	  religious	  investors	  have	  also	  been	  engaging	  
corporations	  with	  notable	  success.	  Jones	  (2012,	  pp.	  5-­‐6)	  notes	  the	  success	  that	  faith	  investors	  have	  had	  
with	  regard	  to	  the	  human	  right	  to	  water.	  For	  instance	  through	  engagement	  with	  faith	  investors,	  PepsiCo	  
adopted	  the	  first	  corporate	  human	  right	  to	  water	  policy	  in	  2009	  (Kropp,	  2009).	  	  This	  action	  was	  followed	  
by	   Intel,	  Proctor	  and	  Gamble,	  and	  Connecticut	  Water	   (Jones,	  2012,	  p.	  6).	   In	   the	   following	  sections	  we	  
discuss	  more	  elaborately	  NJCIR’s	  engagement	  with	  Chevron	  Corporation	  on	  the	   issue	  of	  human	  rights.	  
We	  first	  begin	  with	  elaborating	  on	  Chevron’s	  engagement	  with	  the	  local	  community	  in	  the	  Niger	  Delta.	  
	  
Engagement	  of	  the	  local	  community	  in	  the	  Niger	  Delta	  	  
In	   2004,	   Chevron	  Nigeria	   started	   a	   process	   of	   engagement	  with	   people	   of	   the	  Niger	  Delta	   of	  Nigeria.	  
Chevron	  operates	   in	   five	   states	  of	   the	  Niger	  Delta	  and	   they	  are	  Bayelsa,	  Delta,	   Imo,	  Ondo	  and	  Rivers.	  
This	   area	   has	   experienced	   escalated	   violence	   and	   uprising	   since	   the	   "judicial	   murder"	   of	   Ogoni	  
environmentalist	  Ken	  Saro-­‐Wiwa	  and	  eight	  others	   (BBC,	  1995).	   In	  2009,	  Royal	  Dutch	  Shell	  agreed	  to	  a	  
$15.5	  million	  settlement	  in	  a	  case	  accusing	  it	  of	  involvement	  in	  human	  rights	  abuses	  in	  the	  Niger	  Delta	  in	  
the	   early	   1990s	   (Mouawad,	   2009).	   It	   should	   be	   recalled	   that	   after	   the	   death	   of	   Saro	   Wiwa	   and	   his	  
colleagues,	  there	  was	  international	  outrage	  and	  focus	  on	  the	  operations	  of	  corporations	  generally.	  Parts	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of	  this	  were	  aimed	  at	  addressing	  Chevron’s	  observation	  that	  their	  community	  engagement	  strategy	  had	  
been	  “inadequate,	  expensive	  and	  divisive”	  (BBC	  News,	  2005).	  
Before	  this	   time	  most	  oil	  companies	   including	  Chevron	  engaged	  each	  community	   individually	  with	  the	  
concept	  of	  host	  community.	  Host	  community	  refers	  to	  the	  locations	  where	  Chevron	  has	  a	  facility	  such	  as	  
hospital,	  office	  complex,	  well-­‐head,	  flow	  station,	  export	  terminals	  or	  tank	  farm.	  This	  strategy	  of	  dealing	  
only	  with	   the	   host	   community	   unfortunately	   alienated	   all	   other	   communities.	   Such	   a	   strategy	   played	  
into	   the	   inter-­‐ethnic	   rivalry	  which	   erupted	   in	   the	  Warri	   area	   in	   2003,	   2007	   etc.	   (Imobighe,	   Bassey,	  &	  
Asuni,	  2002).	  	  
	  
The	   above	   situation	   led	   to	   a	   rethinking	   in	   Chevron’s	   board	   that	   gave	   rise	   to	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	  
Global	  Memorandum	  of	  Understanding	  (GMOU)	  in	  2004.	  The	  GMOU	  is	  a	  process	  that	  clustered	  several	  
communities	   together	   under	   what	   is	   known	   as	   the	   Regional	   Development	   Committee	   (RDC).	   Each	  
community	   nominated,	   appointed	   or	   elected	   their	   representatives	   into	   the	   RDC.	   The	   RDC	   members	  
elected	   from	   among	   themselves	   officials	   such	   as	   the	   chairperson,	   secretary,	   treasurer,	   publicity	  
secretary	   etc.	   These	   officials	  managed	   the	   RDC	   on	   a	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   basis	  with	   some	   salaried	   employees.	  
There	   are	   eight	   RDCs	   scattered	   in	   five	   states	   of	   the	   Niger	   Delta	   of	   Nigeria.	   And	   the	   GMOU	   is	  
renegotiated	   after	   every	   three	   years	   of	   operation.	   Items	   that	   are	   negotiated	   after	   every	   three	   years	  
include	  the	  project	  fund,	  employment,	  contracts	  and	  other	  benefits.	  
	  
Chevron	  provided	  some	  initial	  annual	  seed	  grant	  for	  the	  RDCs	  to	  carry	  out	  development	  projects	  in	  their	  
areas.	   The	   unique	   feature	   here	   is	   that	   community	  members	  managed	   the	   fund	   through	   their	   elected	  
representatives.	  It	  also	  provides	  the	  opportunity	  for	  the	  communities	  to	  raise	  independent	  funding	  from	  
sundry	  sources	  for	  their	  development.	  One	  key	  ingredient	  of	  this	  process	  was	  the	  sustainable	  livelihood	  
assessment	   (SLA).	   It	  was	   from	  the	  SLA	  process	   that	   community	  needs	  were	   identified	  and	  community	  
development	  plans	   (CDP)	  were	  also	  derived.	  The	   importance	  of	   this	   is	   that	  communities	  decided	  their	  
development	  priorities,	  decided	  who	  will	  execute	  the	  contract,	  where	  it	  will	  be	  located	  etc.	  
	  
There	  were	  also	  other	  governance	  models	   that	  were	  part	  of	   the	  GMOU;	   they	   include	   the	  Community	  
Engagement	   Management	   Board	   (CEMB),	   Project	   Review	   Committee	   (PRC),	   Accounts	   and	   Audit	  
Committee	  (AAC)	  etc.	  All	  the	  above	  are	  structures	  that	  are	  embedded	  in	  the	  GMOU	  to	  support	  service	  
delivery	  and	  community	  development.	  The	  GMOU	  clearly	  provides	  for	  the	  functions	  of	  each	  structure.	  
For	  instance,	  the	  PRC	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  review	  of	  contract	  bidding	  process,	  it	  also	  opens	  the	  bids	  and	  
selects	  the	  winner.	  During	  project	  execution	   it	  also	  monitors	  progress	  on	  project	  sites.	  This	  model	  has	  
been	  copied	  and	  duplicated	  by	  many	  other	  oil	  companies	  and	  corporations	  in	  different	  industry	  sectors.	  
In	  the	  words	  of	  	  Dr.	  I.C.	  Tolar,	  the	  pioneer	  chairman	  of	  Egbema/Gbaramatu	  RDC,	  	  "The	  GMOU	  has	  been	  
a	  worthwhile	  experience."	  It	  was	  put	  together	  by	  those	  who	  understand	  what	  a	  united	  front	  is	  and	  what	  
it	  means	  to	  speak	  with	  one	  voice.	  	  There	  is	  prudent	  management	  of	  resources	  that	  accrue	  to	  the	  council,	  
even	  though	  it	  is	  meager,	  but	  it	  has	  been	  regular.	  In	  comparison	  to	  the	  Local	  Government	  Authority,	  the	  
Council	  has	  succeeded	  more	  and	  the	  success	  could	  be	  measured	  by	  far	  against	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  
LG.	  Within	  the	  three	  years	  period,	  the	  Council	  has	  put	  in	  place	  infrastructure	  in	  the	  communities,	  which	  
have	   been	   non-­‐existent	   since	   the	   inception	   of	   oil	   exploration	   e.g.	   the	   Council	   has	   executed	   and	   is	  
executing	  24	  projects	  within	  the	  length	  and	  breadth	  of	  EGCDC.	  It	  has	  spent	  over	  650million	  Naira	  (about	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$5m)	  on	  these	  projects,	  with	  some	  of	  them	  either	  completed	  or	  near	  completion.	  The	  Council	  has	  also	  
given	  scholarships	  (council	  scholarships)	   in	  addition	  to	  CNL	  scholarships.	  The	  Council	  has	  also	  awarded	  
contracts	  to	  contractors	  in	  the	  communities,	  which	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  local	  economic	  empowerment.	  Contracts	  
are	  not	  awarded	  to	  outsiders	  but	  to	  indigenes	  after	  a	  competitive	  bidding.	  
	  
Examining	   the	  human	   rights	   implications	  of	   the	  GMOU,	   there	  are	   two	  key	  elements	  of	  human	   rights-­‐	  
choice	  and	  respect	  for	  the	  human	  person	  (Steiner	  &	  Alston,	  2000).	  The	  first	  human	  rights	  implication	  of	  
the	  GMOU	   is	   that	   it	   gave	   the	  people	   the	   right	   to	   choose	  what	   they	   consider	   to	   be	  development	   and	  
execute	  the	  same	  according	  to	  their	  specification.	  For	  instance,	  one	  of	  the	  first	  projects	  that	  one	  of	  the	  
communities	   in	   the	   RDC	   system	   selected	  was	   the	   building	   of	   a	  mortuary.	   This	   is	   because,	   due	   to	   the	  
terrain	  of	  the	  area,	  the	  people	  can	  only	  bury	  their	  dead	  in	  the	  last	  two	  months	  of	  the	  year	  when	  there	  is	  
dry	   season.	  Without	   the	  GMOU,	  no	  one	   including	  company	  officials	  would	  have	   thought	  of	  building	  a	  
mortuary	  for	  the	  people.	  Second,	  one	  of	  the	  key	  issues	  that	  has	  given	  vent	  to	  the	  violence	  in	  the	  Niger	  
Delta	   is	   the	   perception	   by	   the	   people	   that	   they	   are	   not	   recognized	   as	   the	   owners	   of	   the	   natural	  
resources	  in	  the	  area.	  The	  GMOU	  is	  a	  tacit	  recognition	  of	  the	  communities	  as	  hosts	  of	  these	  resources.	  
Third,	   the	   GMOU	   is	   more	   broad-­‐based	   in	   its	   definition	   of	   communities	   to	   engage.	   For	   instance,	   it	  
recognizes	  host,	  access,	  and	  impacted	  communities.	  This	  broadened	  understanding	  has	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  
minimized	   the	   targeting	  of	   infrastructure	  during	   conflicts	   (Faleti,	  n.d.).	   This	  perspective	  has	  also	  given	  
the	   people	   a	   voice	   in	   deciding	   how	   their	   affairs	   are	   managed.	   It	   has	   also	   provided	   some	   kind	   of	  
predictability	   in	   their	   relationship	  with	  Chevron.	  This	  point	  was	  noted	   in	   the	  UN	  Guiding	  Principles	  on	  
Human	  Rights	  and	  Business	  (United	  Nations,	  2011).	  
	  
Another	   human	   rights	   implication	   is	   the	   existence	   of	   different	   structures	   for	   engaging	   community	  
members.	   These	   include	   the	   annual	   general	   meetings	   of	   the	   RDC,	   the	   community	   outreach	   by	   RDC	  
members,	  the	  newsletter	  of	  almost	  all	  the	  RDCs,	  the	  meetings	  of	  the	  various	  committees	  and	  the	  regular	  
interface	   with	   Chevron	   lead	   persons.	   Moreover,	   it	   has	   also	   brought	   on	   board	   other	   development	  
agencies	   in	  their	  attempt	  to	  provide	  development	   infrastructure	  to	  the	  communities.	  According	  to	  the	  
evaluation	   carried	  out	  of	   the	  GMOU	   in	  2008	   it	  was	   found	   that	   since	   inception	  of	   the	  GMOU	   in	  2004,	  
there	  have	  been	  no	  single	  incident	  of	  any	  abandoned	  community	  development	  project	  and	  that	  projects	  
are	  executed	  at	  a	  lower	  rate	  and	  delivered	  on	  time.1	  
	  
In	  conclusion,	  no	  community	  engagement	  strategy	  is	  without	  some	  drawbacks	  especially	  when	  they	  are	  
new	   and	   in	   a	   new	   environment.	   One	   of	   the	  main	   criticisms	   of	   the	   GMOU	   is	   that	   the	   criteria	   for	   the	  
allocation	   of	   project	   funds	   are	   not	   clear	   and	   transparent.	   The	   point	   that	   this	   issue	   is	   being	   discussed	  
now,	   is	   an	   improvement	   in	   the	   former	   process	   because,	   then,	   Chevron	   simply	   decided	   the	   project,	  
where	  it	  would	  be	  located,	  who	  would	  execute	  it	  and	  how	  much	  it	  would	  cost.	  The	  process	  can	  still	  be	  
worked	  upon,	  but	  as	  was	  observed	  during	  the	  evaluation,	   the	   issue	   is	  no	   longer	  to	  discard	  the	  GMOU	  
but	   to	   keep	   improving	   upon	   it.	  Moreover	   since	   the	  UNDP	  declared	  development	   as	   a	   human	   right	   in	  
1986,	  the	  GMOU	  process	   is	  a	  clear	  testimony	  that	  development	  can	  be	  achieved	   if	  properly	  managed.	  
The	  greatest	  contribution	  of	  the	  GMOU	  process	  may	  be	  that	  it	  has	  reduced	  to	  the	  barest	  minimum	  the	  
incident	   of	   community-­‐induced	   production	   disruption.	   It	   has	   also	   laid	   out	   an	   in-­‐built	   framework	   for	  
addressing	  human	  rights	  abuses	  that	  arise	  out	  of	  the	  company	  operations.	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In	   the	  preceding	  paragraphs	  we	  have	   laid	  out	  Chevron’s	  engagement	  with	   the	   local	  community	   in	   the	  
Niger	  Delta.	  While	   Chevron	  had	  been	  operating	   in	  Nigeria	   since	   1913	   (Chevron	  Corporation,	   2013),	   it	  
was	  only	  recently	  that	  it	  embarked	  on	  a	  process	  of	  greater	  engagement	  with	  the	  local	  community.	  There	  
was	  a	   shift	   in	  understanding	   its	   role	   from	  an	  operator	  of	  major	  oil	   and	  gas	   capital	   projects	   to	   that	  of	  
being	   a	   member	   of	   the	   local	   community.	   It	   could	   be	   suggested	   that	   such	   a	   shift	   owed	   in	   no	   small	  
measure	  to	  the	  dialogue	  and	  conversation	  with	  the	  shareholder	  coalition.	   In	  the	  following	  sections	  we	  
analyse,	   in	  greater	  detail,	   the	  process	  of	   shareholder	  engagement	  with	  Chevron	  and	   the	   role	   that	   the	  
shareholder	  coalition	  played.	  
	  
Process	  of	  shareholder	  engagement	  with	  Chevron	  	  
NJCIR’s	  engagement	  with	  Chevron	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  human	  rights	  corresponded	  with	  the	  Jesuits’	  apostolic	  
concern	   for	   Africa	   and	   for	   indigenous	   people.	   It	   was	   felt	   that	   “a	   fuller	   human	   rights	   policy	   would	  
simultaneously	   serve	   Chevron’s	   long-­‐term	   interest	   to	   be	   a	   partner	   of	   choice	   and	   also	   improve	   the	  
livelihood	  of	  host	  communities	  in	  areas	  of	  economic,	  environmental	  and	  social	  development”	  (National	  
Jesuit	   Committee	   on	   Investment	   Responsibility,	   2009,	   p.	   5).	   Further,	   it	   was	   felt	   that	   stronger	   human	  
rights	  protections	  by	  Chevron	  would	  also	  encourage	  other	  companies	  in	  the	  extractive	  industry	  to	  follow	  
suit.	  We	  begin	  with	  a	  brief	  background	  of	  Chevron	  and	  then	  elaborate	  on	  the	  process	  of	  engagement.	  
	  
Chevron	  is	  one	  of	  the	  world’s	  leading	  integrated	  energy	  companies	  with	  operations	  worldwide.	  It	  is	  one	  
of	   the	   world’s	   six	   super-­‐major	   oil	   companies	   and	   was	   ranked	   the	   third	   largest	   US	   company	   in	   the	  
Fortune	   500	   rankings	   for	   2012	   (CNN	  Money,	   2012)	   It	   is	   involved	   in	   nearly	   every	   facet	   of	   the	   energy	  
industry	   (Chevron	   Corporation,	   2011).	   At	   the	   end	   of	   2011,	   Chevron’s	   workforce	   consisted	   of	   about	  
57,000	  employees	  and	  3,800	  service	  station	  employees	  (Chevron	  Corporation,	  2012).	  Chevron’s	  history	  
goes	  back	  to	  the	  Pacific	  Coast	  Oil	  Co	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century	  which	  then	  became	  Standard	  Oil	  Co.	  
of	   California	   and	   includes	   acquisitions	   and	   mergers	   such	   as	   Gulf	   Oil,	   Texaco,	   and	   Unocal	   (Chevron	  
Corporation,	  2012).	  The	  decision	  to	  engage	  Chevron	  was	  taken	  by	  the	  NJCIR	  in	  2004.	  On	  September	  8	  of	  
that	  year,	  a	  conference	  call	  was	  initiated	  among	  some	  Chevron	  investors	  to	  assess	  the	  relationship	  and	  
issues	  with	  the	  company.	  	  
	  
In	  November	  2004,	  a	  placeholder	  resolution2	  was	  filed	  by	  investors	  with	  the	  Wisconsin	  Province	  of	  NJCIR	  
as	   the	   lead.	   This	   resolution	  urged	   the	   company	   to	  adopt	   a	   comprehensive,	   transparent	   and	  verifiable	  
human	   rights	   policy	   noting	   that	   “transnational	   corporations	   operating	   in	   countries	   with	   repressive	  
governments,	   ethnic	   conflict,	  weak	   rule	  of	   law,	  endemic	   corruption,	  or	  poor	   labor	   and	  environmental	  
standards	   face	  serious	   risks	   to	   their	   reputation	  and	  share	  value	   if	   they	  are	  seen	  as	   responsible	   for,	  or	  
complicit	   in,	   human	   rights	   violations.”	   The	   resolution	   was	   withdrawn	   in	   February	   2005	   when	   the	  
company	   agreed	   to	   future	   human	   rights	   dialogues	   and	   a	   meeting	   between	   Chevron	   Nigeria	   Limited	  
(CNL),	  the	   local	  communities	   in	  the	  Niger	  Delta	  and	  the	  Center	  for	  Social	  and	  Corporate	  Responsibility	  
(CSCR).	   CSCR	   was	   founded	   by	   Father	   Kevin	   O’Hara	   in	   2001	   as	   a	   means	   of	   supporting	   the	   “most	  
vulnerable	  people	   in	   the	  Niger	  Delta	  by	   responding	   to	   the	  conflicts	   triggered	  by	  poor	  management	  of	  
the	  extraction	  of	  oil	  and	  gas”	  (Bamat,	  Chassy,	  &	  Warne,	  2011,	  p.	  86).	  CSCR	  produced	  a	  number	  of	  video	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documentaries	  as	  an	  advocacy	  tool	  to	  increase	  international	  awareness	  about	  the	  situation	  in	  the	  Niger	  
Delta	  (Bamat	  et	  al.,	  2011,	  p.	  95).3	  	  
	  
In	   the	   fall	  of	  2005	  NJCIR	   in	  partnership	  with	  CSCR	  and	  Catholic	  Relief	  Services	  organized	  the	  Africa	  Oil	  
and	  Poverty	  speaking	  tour	  visiting	  U.S.	  universities	  (Interfaith	  Center	  for	  Corporate	  Responsibility,	  2005).	  
The	  purpose	  of	  the	  tour	  was	  to	  draw	  greater	  attention	  to	  the	  situation	  in	  the	  oil	  producing	  countries	  of	  
Africa,	  which	  experience	  the	  natural	  resource	  curse,	  the	  phenomenon	  whereby	  the	  citizens	  of	  resource-­‐
rich	  countries	  often	  experience	  repression	  and	  a	   lower	  standard	  of	   living.	   In	  essence	  the	  communities	  
living	   near	  mineral	   resources	   receive	   very	   little	   benefit	   but	   rather	   bear	   the	   environmental	   and	   social	  
costs	  associated	  with	   resource	  extraction.	  The	  Nigerian	  Catholic	  Bishops	  document	   this	   legacy	   in	   their	  
200-­‐page	  document,	  The	  Travesty	  of	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Wealth.	  	  
	  
In	  November	  2005,	  NJCIR	  filed	  the	  human	  rights	  resolution	  at	  Chevron	  with	  the	  Wisconsin	  Province	  once	  
again	  as	  the	  lead.	  At	  the	  annual	  meeting	  of	  Chevron	  in	  April	  2006,	  the	  human	  rights	  resolution	  received	  
23.93%	   of	   the	   shares	   voted	   as	   well	   as	   the	   endorsement	   of	   two	   of	   the	   three	   major	   proxy	   advisory	  
services,	   namely,	   Institutional	   Shareholder	   Services	   and	   Proxy	   Governance	   (Africa	   Faith	   &	   Justice	  
Network,	  2007).	  Such	  an	  endorsement	  contrasts	  with	   the	   findings	  of	  Rojas	  et	  al.	   (2009,	  p.	  240)	  which	  
held	  that	  “religious	  investors	  were	  responsible	  for	  almost	  half	  (47.8	  percent)	  of	  resolutions	  that	  failed	  to	  
gather	   enough	   vote	   turnover	   for	   resubmission.”	   In	   the	   months	   following	   the	   annual	   meeting,	   the	  
investor	  coalition	  conveyed	  to	  Chevron	  representatives	  its	  dissatisfaction	  at	  the	  company’s	  progress	  of	  
the	  development	  of	  the	  human	  rights	  policy.	  	  
	  
The	  following	  year	  (November	  2006),	  the	  investor	  coalition	  once	  again	  filed	  the	  human	  rights	  resolution	  
with	  22	  co-­‐filers.	  At	  the	  annual	  meeting	   in	  April	  2007,	  the	  human	  rights	  resolution	  received	  26.94%	  of	  
the	  shares	  voted	  (Africa	  Faith	  &	  Justice	  Network,	  2007).	  The	  growth	  of	  co-­‐filers	  and	  the	  shareholder	  vote	  
was	   encouraging	   and	   regular	   dialogues	   continued	  with	   the	   company.	  While	   Chevron	   adopted	   a	   one-­‐
page	   human	   rights	   statement	   in	   2006,	   shareholders	   deemed	   this	   insufficient	   to	   satisfy	   the	   goal	   of	   a	  
fuller	  and	  more	  explicit	  policy.	  In	  November	  2007,	  the	  human	  rights	  resolution	  was	  filed	  again,	  this	  time	  
with	  30	  co-­‐filers.	   In	  December	  2007,	  a	  follow-­‐up	  letter	  was	  sent	  by	  Rev.	  Tom	  Krettek,	  provincial	  of	  the	  
Wisconsin	  Province	  of	  the	  Society	  of	  Jesus	  to	  David	  O’Reilly,	  CEO	  of	  Chevron,	  establishing	  the	  business	  
case	   that	   the	   development	   of	   a	   policy	   would	   protect	   shareholder	   value	   and	   enhance	   Chevron’s	  
competitive	  advantage	  as	  a	  partner	  of	  choice	  (Securities	  and	  Exchange	  Commission,	  2008,	  Exhibit-­‐A).	  In	  
the	   following	  month,	   Chevron	   challenged	   the	   human	   rights	   resolution	   that	   was	   filed	   by	   the	   investor	  
coalition	  with	   the	   Securities	   and	  Exchange	  Commission	   (SEC)	   claiming	   that	   the	   resolution	  had	  already	  
been	  substantially	  implemented.	  The	  investor	  coalition	  approached	  Paul	  Neuhauser,	  an	  attorney	  closely	  
associated	  with	  ICCR,	  to	  represent	  them	  to	  the	  SEC.	  In	  his	  defense	  to	  the	  SEC	  dated	  February	  24,	  2008,	  
Mr.	   Neuhauser	   laid	   out	   the	   investor	   coalition’s	   position	   that	   the	   substance	   of	   the	   human	   rights	  
resolution	  was	  far	  from	  implemented.	  In	  his	  letter,	  Mr.	  Neuhauser	  also	  showed	  the	  number	  of	  not-­‐free	  
and/or	  high	  conflict	  zones	  where	  Chevron	  operated	  (Securities	  and	  Exchange	  Commission,	  2008,	  Exhibit-­‐
H).	   In	  March	   2008,	   the	   SEC	   ruled	   in	   favor	   of	   the	   investor	   coalition	   and	   stated	   that	   the	   human	   rights	  
resolution	  must	  appear	  on	  the	  proxy	  (Securities	  and	  Exchange	  Commission,	  2008).	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In	  December	  2008,	  the	  human	  rights	  resolution	  was	  filed	  again	  with	  36	  co-­‐filers.	  At	  the	  annual	  meeting	  
in	   May	   2009,	   the	   human	   rights	   resolution	   received	   29.14%	   of	   the	   shares	   voted	   (National	   Jesuit	  
Committee	   on	   Investment	   Responsibility,	   2009,	   p.	   3).	   In	   July	   2009,	   Chevron	   communicated	   to	   the	  
investor	  coalition	  that	  they	  were	  working	  on	  a	  human	  rights	  policy.	  After	  consultation	  with	  the	  co-­‐filers,	  
Rev.	  Tom	  Krettek,	  provincial	  of	   the	  Wisconsin	  province	  wrote	   to	   then	  Vice-­‐Chair	  and	   future	  CEO	   John	  
Watson	  specifying	  the	  conditions	  that	  the	   investor	  coalition	  needed	  to	  see	   in	  order	  to	  hold	  off	   filing	  a	  
resolution.	  As	  these	  conditions	  were	  still	  lacking	  as	  of	  early	  December	  2009,	  the	  investor	  coalition	  went	  
ahead	   and	   filed	   the	   human	   rights	   resolution	   on	  December	   1	  with	   42	   co-­‐filers.	   At	   the	   end	   of	   January	  
2010,	  Chevron	  communicated	  to	  the	  investor	  coalition	  that	  it	  had	  adopted	  Human	  Rights	  Policy	  520	  and	  
shared	  the	  same	  with	  the	  42	  filers	  of	  the	  resolution.	  In	  March	  2010,	  satisfied	  with	  the	  actions	  taken	  by	  
Chevron,	  the	  investor	  coalition	  withdrew	  the	  resolution	  (Securities	  and	  Exchange	  Commission,	  2010).	  In	  
April	   2010,	   Chevron	   publicly	   announced	   the	   development	   of	   Policy	   520	   on	   their	   website	   and	   NJCIR	  
issued	   a	   press	   release	   the	   following	   day.	   The	   Jesuit	   Conference	   of	   the	  United	   States	   said	   that	   it	  was	  
encouraged	   by	   Chevron’s	   new	   Policy	   520	   on	   human	   rights	   and	   the	   Very	   Rev.	   G.	   Thomas	   Krettek,	  
Provincial	  of	  the	  Wisconsin	  Province	  of	  the	  Society	  of	  Jesus	  was	  quoted	  as	  saying	  “we	  remain	  committed	  
to	   ongoing	   dialogue	  with	   Chevron	   regarding	   implementation,	  monitoring,	   reporting,	   and	   incentivizing	  
the	   policy,	   as	   well	   as	   identifying	   potential	   areas	   where	   Policy	   520	   might	   be	   strengthened”	   (PRWeb,	  
2010).	  	  	  
	  
While	  the	  preceding	  paragraphs	  provide	  a	  historical	  sketch	  of	  the	  progression	  towards	  a	  human	  rights	  
policy	  during	  the	  period	  of	  2004	  to	  2009,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  there	  were	  many	  other	  forces	  at	  work.	  
For	   one,	   the	   investor	   coalition	   was	   able	   to	   draw	   from	   on-­‐the-­‐ground	   realities	   provided	   by	   the	   close	  
collaboration	  with	   the	   CSCR,	   the	   Africa	   Center	   for	   Corporate	   Responsibility,	   and	   the	   Catholic	   Bishops	  
Conference	  of	  Nigeria.	  It	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  NJCIR	  coalition	  was	  able	  to	  progressively	  increase	  
its	  co-­‐filer	  base	  and	  the	  annual	  supporting	  votes	  for	  the	  resolution	  at	  each	  annual	   interval.	  Over	   time,	  
this	  shareholder	  engagement	  grew	   into	   ICCR’s	   largest	  action	  (measured	  by	  co-­‐filers)	  and	   it	  attracted	  a	  
diverse	  array	  of	  institutional	  investors	  including	  international	  Jesuit	  provinces	  and	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  
Jesuit	  universities	  and	  high	   schools.	  Additionally,	   the	   shareholder	  engagement	  was	  helped	  by	   support	  
from	  two	  large	  proxy	  advisory	  services:	  Institutional	  Shareholder	  Services	  and	  Proxy	  Governance.	  
	  
While	  faith-­‐based	  health	  care	  networks	  have	  long	  engaged	  shareholder	  advocacy,	  this	  was	  a	  new	  area	  
for	   educational	   institutions	   and	   many	   are	   now	   poised	   to	   continue	   this	   advocacy.	   	   NJCIR	   strives	   for	  
respectful	   and	   well-­‐informed	   dialogues	   and	   while	   the	   attainment	   of	   the	   policy	   took	  many	   years,	   we	  
believe	  this	  tone	  yields	  a	  better	  outcome	  than	  a	  more	  adversarial	  approach.	  Finally,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  
that	   Chevron	   displayed	   a	   willingness	   to	   engage	   the	   investor	   group	   as	   well	   as	   thought	   leaders	   in	   the	  
rapidly	   changing	   area	   of	   business/human	   rights	   and	   perhaps	   most	   importantly	   they	   consulted	   local	  
communities.	  We	  highlight	  this	  latter	  aspect	  in	  the	  following	  section.	  	  	  
	  
Case	  Analysis	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  shareholder	  salience	  
Mitchell,	  Agle,	  and	  Wood	  (1997,	  p.	  854)	  offer	  a	  descriptive	  model	  of	  stakeholder	  salience	  and	  propose	  
three	  attributes	  of	  stakeholders	  that	  managers	  need	  to	  pay	  attention	  to.	  These	  attributes	  are:	  “(1)	  the	  
stakeholder’s	  power	  to	   influence	  the	  firm,	  (2)	  the	   legitimacy	  of	  the	  stakeholder’s	  relationship	  with	  the	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firm,	  and	  (3)	  the	  urgency	  of	  the	  stakeholder’s	  claim	  on	  the	  firm.”	  Mitchell	  et	  al.	  (1997,	  p.	  879,	  emphasis	  
added)	  “predict	  that	  the	  salience	  of	  a	  particular	  stakeholder	  to	  the	  firm’s	  management	  is	  low	  if	  only	  one	  
attribute	  is	  present,	  moderate	  if	  two	  attributes	  are	  present,	  and	  high	  if	  all	  three	  attributes	  are	  present.”	  
A	  later	  study	  by	  Gifford	  (2010)	  with	  regard	  to	  shareholder	  engagement	  confirms	  that	  shareholders	  are	  
most	  salient	  when	  all	  three	  attributes	  are	  present.	  However,	  Gifford’s	  study	  also	  concludes	  that	  all	  three	  
attributes	  need	  not	  be	  present	   to	  achieve	  high	   levels	  of	   salience.	  Gifford	   (2010,	  p.	  97)	   instead	  argues	  
that	   “the	  business	   case	   and	   the	   values	   of	   the	   target	   company	  managers	   are	   the	   two	  most	   important	  
factors	  contributing	  to	  salience.”	  We	  examine	  this	  claim	  in	  the	  light	  of	  our	  experience	  with	  Chevron	  in	  
the	  following	  paragraphs.	  
	  
From	  the	  very	  beginning	  of	  the	  engagement	  with	  Chevron,	  NJCIR	  made	  the	  business	  case,	  namely,	  that	  a	  
comprehensive	   human	   rights	   policy	   would	   help	   in	   mitigating	   the	   risks	   associated	   with	   human	   rights	  
abuses	   in	   countries	  with	  weak	   rule	  of	   law	  and	  would	   contribute	   to	   long-­‐term	   increase	   in	   shareholder	  
value.	   However,	   we	   cannot	   conclude	   with	   any	   degree	   of	   certainty	   that	   the	   business	   case	   was	   an	  
important	   contributing	   factor	   to	   shareholder	   salience.	   This	   uncertainty	   is	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  
supporting	   statement	   for	   the	   resolution	   filed	   in	   2009	   specifically	  mentioned	   that	   the	   “policy	  will	   help	  
avoid	  human	  rights	  violations	  and	  associated	  shareholder	  risks,	  thereby	  preserving	  and	  enhancing	  share	  
value”	   (Jesuit	   Conference,	   2009).	   Instead,	   from	   our	   experience	   “coalition	   building	   among	   the	  
shareholders”	  and	  “credibility”	  were	  the	  two	  key	  factors	  that	  contributed	  to	  shareholder	  salience	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  the	  engagement	  with	  Chevron.	  We	  elaborate	  on	  both	  these	  below.	  
	  
While	  Gifford’s	  study	   identified	  “coalition-­‐building”	  as	  a	  moderating	  variable	  he	  held	   that	   it	  was	  not	  a	  
major	   contributing	   factor	   to	   shareholder	   salience.	   Our	   experience	   with	   Chevron	   indicates	   that	  
“coalition-­‐building”	   did	   play	   a	   major	   role	   in	   the	   advocacy	   efforts.	   Chevron’s	   willingness	   to	   engage	  
increased	  as	  the	  shareholder	  votes	  supporting	  the	  resolution	  increased.	  From	  an	  impressive	  24%	  of	  the	  
vote	  when	  the	  resolution	  was	  first	  voted	  on	  at	  the	  annual	  meeting	  in	  2006	  to	  over	  29%	  at	  the	  meeting	  in	  
2009,	   the	   shareholder	   resolution	   kept	   gaining	  momentum.	  We	   doubt	   that	   the	   company	   would	   have	  
engaged	  us	  if	  the	  shareholder	  vote	  was	  in	  the	  single	  digits.	  In	  fact,	  because	  the	  initial	  vote	  was	  24%	  we	  
were	  able	  to	  secure	  an	  audience	  with	  Mr.	  Peter	  Robertson,	  the	  Vice	  Chair	  of	  the	  Board	  in	  June	  2006.	  
	  
A	  study	  by	  Allen,	  Letourneau	  and	  Hebb	  (2012)	  found	  that	  legitimacy	  (credibility)	  was	  the	  dominant	  force	  
in	  a	  successful	  engagement.	  Our	  engagement	  with	  Chevron	  supports	  this	  conclusion.	  Credibility	  is	  built	  
through	   fostering	   an	   enduring	   and	   constructive	   relationship	   with	   the	   company.	   It	   requires	   the	  
shareholder	  group	  to	  have	  the	  willingness	  to	  engage	  in	  open	  and	  constructive	  dialogue.	  Not	  to	  be	  judges	  
but	   to	   offer	   perspectives	   and	   to	   be	   willing	   to	   listen.	   These	   were	   some	   of	   the	   points	   that	   Ms.	   Silvia	  
Garrigo,	   the	   former	   Manager	   of	   Global	   Issues	   and	   Policy	   at	   Chevron,	   raised	   at	   the	   2009	   SRI	   in	   the	  
Rockies	   Conference	   (Garrigo,	   2009).	  We	   elaborate	   on	   this	   point	   in	   further	   detail	   in	   the	   next	   section	  
where	  we	  discuss	  some	  of	  the	  key	  lessons	  learned.	  
	  
Key	  lessons	  learned	  and	  future	  research	  
The	   Jesuit-­‐led	   coalition	  had	  more	   than	   just	   a	   series	  of	  engagements	  with	  Chevron	  over	   time.	   Instead,	  
they	  fostered	  an	  enduring	  constructive	  relationship	  and	  dialogue.	  An	  important	  reason	  for	  this	  was	  that	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from	  the	  outset,	  the	  Jesuit-­‐led	  coalition	  were	  not	  judgmental	  but	  offered	  their	  views	  and	  were	  willing	  to	  
listen.	  Despite	  frustrations,	  the	  dialogue	  was	  not	  used	  as	  a	  means	  to	  “name	  and	  shame”	  the	  company,	  
its	   actions	   or	   lack	   thereof.	   This	   attitude	   helped	   create	   the	   trust	   to	   develop	   an	   enduring	   relationship.	  
Some	  of	  the	  key	  lessons	  are	  briefly	  elaborated	  below.	  
	  
The	  first	  lesson	  is	  the	  importance	  of	  framing	  the	  issue.	  While	  the	  topic	  of	  human	  rights	  is	  	  an	  important	  
apostolic	  priority	  for	  the	  Jesuits,	  it	  was	  important	  to	  frame	  the	  discussion	  around	  human	  rights	  in	  a	  way	  
that	  was	  directly	  relevant	  to	  the	  company’s	  risks	  and	  operations,	  and	  to	  offer	  positions	  and	  tools	  that	  
were	   tailored	   to	   the	   relative	   significance	   of	   related	   issues	   and	   that	   were	   doable	   given	   the	   size	   and	  
complexity	   of	   the	   company.	   During	   the	   dialogue,	   it	   was	   important	   to	   discern	   whether:	   (i)	   the	   issue	  
touched	  the	  company’s	  operations	  but	  had	  wider	  implications	  and	  required	  other	  or	  multiple	  actors	  to	  
work	   together;	   (ii)	   the	   issue	   was	   emerging	   with	   no	   clear	   standard	   or	   best	   practice	   to	   follow	   and	  
therefore	  required	  continuous	  dialogue;	  (iii)	  the	  issue	  was	  driven	  by	  a	  perception	  which	  was	  subject	  to	  
change	   through	   a	   deeper	   understanding	   of	   the	   company’s	   culture,	   policies,	   performance	   standards,	  
management	   systems,	   and	   their	   real	   time	   application	   in	   the	   field.;	   (iv)	   the	   issue	   was	   outside	   the	  
company’s	   control	   or	  was	   solely	   in	   the	   realm	   of	   “guilt	   by	   association”;	   or	   (v)	   a	   common	   ground	  was	  
shared	   on	   the	   issue,	   but	   for	   good	   reasons,	   the	   company	   and	   the	   shareholder	   coalition	   were	   on	   a	  
different	  path	  towards	  a	  solution.	  	  
	  
The	  second	  lesson	  is	  that	  the	  dialogue	  or	  engagement	  should	  focus	  on	  obtaining	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  
of	   the	  company	  over	   time.	  Lack	  of	  understanding	   the	  complexities	  of	   the	  company	  and	   its	  operations	  
could	   likely	  result	   in	   increased	  suspicion	  and	   lack	  of	  trust.	  Credibility	   in	  our	  engagement	  with	  Chevron	  
was	  developed	  in	  many	  ways	  by	  our	  willingness	  to	  try	  to	  understand	  the	  company.	  And,	  it	  was	  helped	  by	  
the	  subsequent	  willingness	  of	  the	  company	  to	  try	  to	  understand	  us.	  
	  	  
The	  third	  lesson	  is	  that	  of	  coalition	  building.	  One	  of	  the	  lessons	  learned	  from	  the	  dialogue	  process	  was	  
the	   importance	   of	   soliciting	   support	   from	   other	   like-­‐minded	   investors.	   Being	   a	   member	   of	   the	   ICCR	  
coalition,	  NJCIR	  was	  able	  to	  leverage	  the	  ICCR	  membership	  in	  addition	  to	  its	  own.	  The	  support	  of	  other	  
Jesuit	   institutions	   helped	   increase	   the	   pressure	   on	   the	   company	   to	   develop	   a	   comprehensive	   human	  
rights	  policy.	  Additionally,	   the	  support	   from	   Institutional	  Shareholder	  Services,	  and	  Proxy	  Governance,	  
two	  large	  proxy	  advisory	  services	  helped.	  
	  	  
The	  fourth	  lesson	  is	  that	  of	  making	  the	  business	  case.	  From	  the	  very	  beginning,	  NJCIR	  made	  the	  business	  
case	  for	  adopting	  a	  comprehensive	  human	  rights	  policy.	  NJCIR’s	  position	  was	  that	  such	  a	  policy	  would	  
help	   Chevron	   in	   its	   global	   operations	   and	   ultimately	   add	   to	   shareholder	   and	   investor	   value.	   As	   a	  
shareholder	  coalition	  it	  was	  important	  to	  make	  such	  a	  case	  even	  if,	  as	  we	  pointed	  out	  earlier,	  it	  did	  not	  
contribute	  significantly	  to	  shareholder	  salience.	  
	  	  
The	   fifth	   lesson	   is	   that	   of	   persistence.	   Shareholder	   advocacy	   is	   a	   long	   route	   and	   can	   be	   sometimes	  
painfully	  slow.	  It	  took	  a	  number	  of	  years	  before	  Chevron	  adopted	  a	  comprehensive	  human	  rights	  policy	  
and	   at	   any	   stage	   during	   those	   years,	   the	   shareholder	   coalition	   could	   have	   given	   up.	   But	   remaining	  
engaged	  and	  soliciting	  greater	  support	  from	  a	  wider	  investor	  base	  helped.	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The	  sixth	  lesson	  is	  that	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  tapping	  into	  Jesuit	  higher	  education	  institutions	  not	  only	  for	  
their	   shareholder	   co-­‐filings/votes	   but	   also	   for	   participation	   and	   expertise	   at	   dialogues	   and	   annual	  
meetings.	  There	  were	  a	  number	  of	  professors	  at	  Jesuit	  universities	  who	  presented	  statements	  at	  annual	  
meetings	  or	  who	  offered	  consultation	  on	  various	  occasions.	  Drawing	  on	  this	  intellectual	  capital	  is	  crucial.	  
It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  engagement	  with	  Chevron	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  human	  rights	  was	  concurrent	  with	  
the	   work	   of	   then	   UN	   Special	   Representative	   for	   Business	   and	   Human	   Rights,	   Professor	   John	   Ruggie.	  
Professor	   Ruggie’s	   multi-­‐year	   consultation	   led	   to	   the	   release	   of	   a	   framework	   in	   2011	   titled	   “Guiding	  
Principles	  for	  the	  Implementation	  of	  the	  UN	  ‘Protect,	  Respect	  and	  Remedy’	  Framework.”	  	  
	  
While	  Chevron	  has	  adopted	  Policy	  520,	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  what	  impact	  this	  policy	  will	  have	  on	  their	  
operations	  and	  ultimately	  on	  host	  communities.	  On	   its	  part,	  Chevron	  has	  expressed	  a	  commitment	   to	  
implementing	  this	  policy	  over	  a	  four-­‐year	  period.	  However,	  future	  research	  can	  evaluate	  the	  extent	  the	  
company	  was	  able	  to	  embed	  the	  policy	  in	  its	  operations,	  develop	  accountability	  metrics,	  independently	  




Notwithstanding	   the	   fact	   that	   this	   research	   focuses	   on	   a	   single	   case	   and	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   co-­‐authors	  
were	   involved	  directly	   in	   the	  process	  of	  engagement,	   there	  are	  a	   few	  key	   findings.	  For	  one,	  our	  study	  
supports	  the	  finding	  of	  Allen	  et	  al.	   (2012)	  that	   legitimacy	  (credibility)	   is	  the	  dominant	  force	   in	  bringing	  
about	   successful	   engagement.	   This	   credibility	   was	   brought	   about	   by	   the	   willingness	   to	   engage	   in	   a	  
constructive	   and	   open	   dialogue	   and	   to	   obtain	   a	   deeper	   understanding	   of	   the	   company.	   Second,	   our	  
analysis,	   in	   a	   way,	   calls	   into	   question	   Gifford’s	   (2010)	   conclusion	   that	   coalition-­‐building	   is	   not	   a	  
significant	   moderating	   variable	   for	   shareholder	   salience.	   We	   hold	   that	   it	   is	   and	   that	   it	   played	   an	  
important	   role	   in	  our	  process	  of	  engagement	  with	  Chevron.	  This	   claim	  would	  have	   to	  be	  validated	  or	  
contradicted	  by	  future	  research.	  	  
	  
Finally,	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  key	  question	  of	  this	  volume	  on	  whether	  SRI	  makes	  a	  difference	  to	  society,	  we	  
hold	  that	  it	  does.	  Companies	  do	  not	  operate	  in	  a	  vacuum.	  They	  impact	  society	  by	  their	  operations.	  And	  
for	   a	   large	   part,	   these	   operations	   are	   governed	   by	   company	   policies.	   Being	   a	   signatory	   to	   the	   UN	  
declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  is	  quite	  different	  from	  having	  a	  policy	  that	  demonstrates	  a	  commitment	  to	  
human	  rights.	  It	  is	  the	  expectation	  that	  policy	  520	  will	  enable	  Chevron	  to	  demonstrate	  leadership	  in	  the	  
area	  of	  corporate	  commitment	  to	  human	  rights.	  However,	  we	  should	  not	  lose	  sight	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  
policies	  sit	  on	  the	  shelf	  and	  gather	  dust.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  imperative	  that	  future	  research	  investigate	  the	  
degree	  to	  which	  	  policy	  520	  did	  impact	  society.	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1	  The	  monitors	  that	  carried	  out	  the	  evaluation	  include	  Consensus-­‐Building	  Institute,	  Research	  Triangle	  
International,	  Search	  for	  Common	  Ground	  and	  Africa	  Center	  for	  Corporate	  Responsibility.	  
2	  A	  placeholder	  resolution	  is	  a	  proposal	  sent	  by	  shareholders	  to	  the	  management	  for	  inclusion	  in	  the	  proxy	  
statement,	  a	  booklet	  that	  contains	  governance	  and	  financial	  information	  and	  that	  is	  sent	  to	  all	  shareholders	  before	  
the	  annual	  meeting.	  	  
3	  These	  documentaries	  include	  Goat	  in	  the	  Flow	  Station,	  Batan	  Oil	  Spill,	  Fence	  Too	  High,	  Neighborhood	  Water	  
Scheme	  in	  Gbarain	  and	  Oil	  Extraction	  and	  Challenges	  of	  Sustainable	  Community	  Development	  in	  Oloibiri	  
